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The Exigent Circumstances Exception
To the Warrant Requirement
by H. Patrick Furman
U.S. Constitution guaran-T he Fourth Amendment to thetees the right of the people tob free from u reasonabl
searches and seizures. Colorado Consti-
tution Article II, § 7 makes the same
guarantee in virtually identical lan-
guage. Searches conducted without war-
rants are "per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment-subject only
to few specifically established and well
delineated exceptions."' One of these ex-
ceptions is the exigent circumstances
exception, 2 which this article discusses.
General Principles and
Procedures
A defendant, as the moving party in a
suppression hearing, has the burden of
proof. However, because a warrantless
search and seizure is presumptively ille-
gal, the defendant can satisfy that bur-
den merely by establishing that the po-
lice did not have a warrant.' The prose-
cution then has the burden of establish-
ing an exception to the warrant require-
ment.4 This general rule applies with
full force at hearings in which it is ar-
gued that the exigent circumstances ex-
ception applies.5
Proof that an exigent circumstance
exists requires, first and foremost, proof
that probable cause exists. An exigent
circumstance is not a substitute for prob-
able cause. It is merely an exception to
Column Ed.: H. Patrick Furman
of the University of Colorado
School of Law, Boulder-492-8126
the warrant requirement in a situation
where probable cause already exists.
The prosecution bears the burden of es-
tablishing probable cause, just as it
bears the burden of establishing the exi-
gent circumstance itself.6
As with other exceptions to the war-
rant requirement, the exigent circum-
stances exception must be narrowly
drawn. If doubt exists about whether
the decision to search was reasonable,
"such doubt must be resolved in favor
of the defendant whose property was
searched."7
The exigent circumstances exception
is broken down into three main cate-
gories:
1) the bona fide pursuit of a fleeing
suspect;
2) situations that create a risk of the
immediate destruction of evidence;
and
3) colorable claims of an emergency
threatening the life of another.8
Proof that a particular set of facts falls
into any of these categories suffices to
meet the requirements of the exigent
circumstances exception. However, it is
not unusual for a particular set of facts
to fall into more than one category. For
example, a suspect who flees with a hos-
tage may create a situation that falls in-
to both the bona fide pursuit and the
life-threatening emergency categories.
The following sections discuss the three
categories in detail.
Hot Pursuit
The bona fide pursuit of a fleeing sus-
pect is recognized by both the U.S. and
Colorado Supreme Courts as an exigent
circumstance that may justify a war-
rantless search.9 In Warden v. Hayden,10
witnesses followed a robbery suspect
from the scene of the robbery to a home.
The police arrived minutes later. The
U.S. Supreme Court was satisfied that
the exigencies of the situation justified
an entry into and a thorough search of
the home. The search included such ac-
tions as looking in the washing machine
and the tank of a recently flushed toilet,
which were approved "as part of an ef-
fort to find a suspected felon, armed,
within the house into which he had run
only minutes before."'
As suggested above, the facts of this
case fit into more than one category of
exigent circumstances. The Court was
concerned with both officer safety and
the possibility of further flight.
An issue that may arise in the context
of a claim that the "hot pursuit" excep-
tion applies to a warrantless search is
whether the pursuit was bona fide. In
People v. Santisteven, the Colorado Court
of Appeals rejected a claim of hot pur-
suit when
the police had information that the
defendant was in his own home, ap-
proximately two hours after the stab-
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bing. They had no evidence that he
was leaving and, indeed, the house
was surrounded by six uniformed offi-
cers to prevent that eventuality.12
Conversely, in a similar situation, the
Colorado Supreme Court found that the
hot pursuit exception extended to a sus-
pect who was surrounded hours after
his offense. In People v. Drake,3 the po-
lice had probable cause to believe the
defendant was involved in a murder
earlier in the day and that he was plan-
ning to leave town. They traced the de-
fendant to a motel room and surround-
ed it. The court found that the police
reasonably feared that the defendant
might attempt to escape once it became
dark. This danger, coupled with the seri-
ousness of the offense and the danger
that the defendant might destroy evi-
dence in the motel room, satisfied the
court that exigent circumstances existed
to justify the warrantless arrest of the
defendant.
It is important to note that, in Drake,
more than one exigency existed. Both
the risk of flight and the danger of de-
struction of evidence were present and
were used to justify the warrantless ar-
rest of the defendant and the search of
his motel room.
Destruction of Evidence
A danger of the loss or destruction of
evidence arises most frequently in drug
cases because drugs often are easily de-
stroyed. The principles to be applied
when the prosecution seeks the applica-
tion of this exception are reasonably
clear.
The burden of proving the applicabili-
ty of the loss or destruction exception
rests on the prosecution. In People v.
Garcia, the Colorado Supreme Court
stated:
The threat of immediate destruction
or removel of evidence constitutes an
exigent circumstance if the prosecu-
tion can demonstrate that the police
had an articulable basis to justify a
reasonable belief that evidence was
about to be removed or destroyed.14
A reasonable belief that evidence is
about to be removed or destroyed has
been proved to the satisfaction of the
Colorado Supreme Court by evidence
that the suspects actually have ob-
served police surveillance.' 5 Evidence
that the suspects may be alerted to the
presence of the police by the fact that
one of their confederates has been ar-
rested also may serve to establish a rea-
sonable fear of destruction of evidence.16
Evidence of the arrest of a person leav-
ing a house that is under surveillance is
not an exigent circumstance in the ab-
sence of some evidence that those in the
house would be alarmed by that per-
son's absence."
The danger of loss or destruction
must be more than speculative. As the
Colorado Supreme Court stated in Peo-
ple v. Thrner,
[t]o justify a warrantless entry and
seizure on the basis of destruction of
evidence, the perceived danger must
be real and immediate.' 8
The simple fact that the evidence in-
volved can be destroyed easily (like most
drugs) does not, by itself, amount to
proof that a real danger of loss or de-
struction exists.19
"A danger of the loss or
destruction of evidence arises
most frequently in drug
cases, because drugs often
are easily destroyed."
The question of whether this exigent
circumstance exists must be evaluated
in light of the principle that the police
should obtain a warrant whenever feasi-
ble. According to the Thrner court:
The question is whether there is a real
or substantial likelihood that the con-
traband or known evidence on the
premises might be removed or de-
stroyed before a warrant could be ob-
tained.20
The loss or destruction exception also
arises in situations where the evidence
itself is transitory. The alcohol in a driv-
er's blood is the most common example
of this type of evidence. The Colorado Su-
preme Court has held that evidence of
the amount of alcohol in a driver's blood
can be admitted in a vehicular homicide
prosecution, even when it has been ob-
tained over the driver's objection. It is
admissible as long as:
1) there is probable cause to arrest
the driver on an alcohol-related
traffic offense;
2) there is a clear indication that a
blood test will provide useful evi-
dence;
3) there are exigent circumstances
that make it impractical to obtain
a warrant; and
4) the test is reasonable and is con-
ducted in a reasonable manner.21
The court held that the necessary exi-
gent circumstance was provided by the
fact that alcohol in the blood begins to di-
minish shortly after the drinking stops,
regardless of what the police or the sus-
pect does. 22
Emergency Exception
In the 1983 case ofPeople v. Clements,
the Colorado Supreme Court stated that
"a bona fide public emergency is a vari-
ant of the exigent circumstances excep-
tion to the warrant requirement."23 The
court, having previously recognized the
existence of the emergency doctrine,
first approved the application of the doc-
trine in a 1977 case, People v. Amato.24
In Amato, police, fire and ambulance
personnel were dispatched on an emer-
gency call concerning a possible drug
overdose. They were directed to the
bathroom of an apartment, where they
found the defendant suffering an appar-
ent drug overdose. Drug paraphernalia
were observed in plain view on a toilet
in the bathroom by a fireman, who point-
ed them out to a policeman. More para-
phernalia were found on the defendant's
person during a cursory search by the
police at the hospital. The trial court
found that no emergency justified these
warrantless searches and suppressed
the items. The Colorado Supreme Court
reversed.
The court did not engage in a detailed
analysis of the emergency exception.
Rather, the court simply noted that the
police and fire personnel were at the
apartment in response to an emergency
call with the primary purpose of render-
ing assistance. They were not searching
for evidence. They found it in plain view
in the bathroom. The court found that
these acts fit within even the "strictest
possible formulation of the emergency
rule."25
In People v. Martin,26 the Court of Ap-
peals ruled on an emergency situation
that occurred when the defendant was
injured in a fall from a balcony at the
home where she worked. The police and
ambulance were called. As the defen-
dant was being transported to the hospi-
tal, she expressed concern about a coat
she had left in the home. The police
went to get the coat and noticed some
cash, which belonged to the defendant,
lying on a counter. They decided to put
the money in her coat. Before putting it
in the coat pocket, a policeman looked in
the pocket, allegedly to make sure there
were no sharp objects in the pocket that
might hurt him. Inside the pocket, he
1168 THE COLORADO LAWYER June
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saw a bindle. The bindle was found to
contain cocaine.
The trial court denied the motion to
suppress, holding that the search of the
coat pocket fell within the emergency
exception. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed, rejecting the argument that any
emergency ended once the defendant
was in the ambulance on the way to the
hospital. The court held that emergency
follow-up procedures fall within the
scope of the emergency and that the de-
cision to put the money in the coat pock-
et was not unreasonable. The court fur-
ther found that, in light of the police of-
ficer's training and experience, his deci-
sions to check the pocket first and to
seize and search the bindle were not un-
reasonable.
The Colorado Supreme Court recently
noted some limits on the emergency doc-
trine. In People v. Wright,27 the defen-
dant was in an automobile accident.
Paramedics gave her purse to a police
officer, who brought it to the hospital
where the paramedics had taken the de-
fendant. The defendant was coherent
and under the care of hospital personnel
when the officer decided to look in her
purse for evidence of identification so
that he could complete his reports. He
found drugs and drug paraphernalia.
The trial court suppressed this evi-
dence, and the Supreme Court affirmed,
rejecting the argument that this search
was justified under the medical emer-
gency exception to the warrant require-
ment. The court found that there was no
medical emergency because the defen-
dant already was receiving appropriate
treatment, and the officer was not look-
ing for information to help in the treat-
ment.
Another type of emergency situation
that falls within the exigent circum-
stances exception involves general
threats to public safety. In People v.
Higbee,28 the Colorado Supreme Court
reversed a trial court order suppressing
physical evidence seized during a search
of the defendant's apartment. The search
was based on the statement of a police
informant-who had purchased a con-
trolled drug from the defendant-that
the defendant had what appeared to be
dynamite rigged to a switch in his car.
The informant stated that the defen-
dant bragged about how he could ex-
plode the dynamite either with the
switch or by a timing device. The police
later observed the defendant carrying
items from his car into his apartment.
They arrested him and searched his car.
During the car search, the police
found the switch described by the infor-
mant, but they did not find any dyna-
mite. The police cleared the area, called
the bomb squad and searched the defen-
dant's apartment. The search revealed
narcotics, not explosives. Based on this
and other information, the police ob-
tained a warrant to search the apart-
ment. The trial court found no emergen-
cy and suppressed the use of the evi-
dence obtained in the search. However,
the Colorado Supreme Court reversed
the order.
The court was satisfied that there
was probable cause to believe an explo-
sive device was located in the defen-
dant's apartment and that the possible
presence of the device gave rise to exi-
gent circumstances that justified the
warrantless search. The court notes
that the trial court should review the to-
tality of the circumstances, including
the time necessary to obtain a warrant,
the character of the investigation and
the risk posed by delay. The dynamite
had great explosive force; a number of
people already had been evacuated from
the area (an apartment complex); there
was the danger of an explosion delayed
by the timing device about which the de-
fendant had bragged; and a warrant
might take two to three hours to obtain.
Based on all these factors, the Supreme
Court stated, "We believe that an emer-
gency situation justifying the warrant-
less entry was adequately established
under the standards articulated in Mal-
czewski." 29
People v. Malczewski had involved the
safety of a baby in an apartment.3 0 A po-
lice officer on routine patrol was told by
the defendant's wife that the defendant
had the couple's baby in the family
apartment. She was concerned about
the safety of the baby because the defen-
dant had been drinking. The officer
went to the apartment and knocked on
the door. The defendant came to the
door, but did not open it. As the parties
spoke through a window, the officer
could hear a baby crying in the back-
ground. After a while, the defendant
brought the baby to the door. Eventual-
ly, the defendant began fighting with the
officer while still holding the baby. When
a second officer arrived, the defendant
was subdued.
In Malczewski, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that the emergency excep-
tion justified the warrantless entry into
the defendant's apartment. The court
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terms somewhat broader than it used in
other cases:
The emergency variant of the exigent
circumstances exception requires a
showing of an immediate crisis inside
the home and the probability that po-
lice assistance will be helpful in alle-
viating that crisis.31
The court also reiterated that the trial
court should examine the totality of the
circumstances as they appeared to the
police officer at the time of the warrant-
less entry.
A public emergency also was found to
exist in Clements.32 The emergency
arose when a police officer smelled ether
in the trunk of a car in an apartment
complex parking lot. Expert testimony
established that ether, when allowed to
stand, is unstable, spontaneously com-
bustible and highly explosive. The police
searched the car under the supervision
of hazardous materials experts and
found, in addition to the ether, con-
trolled substances and other incriminat-
ing evidence.
The trial court found that there was a
colorable claim of emergency but also
found that the police had "used the po-
tential emergency as a pretext for enter-
ing the trunk." The court further found
that the police could have alleviated the
emergency in a less intrusive manner.33
Based on this finding, the trial court
concluded that the discovery of the
drugs in the trunk was not inadvertent.
Thus, the court found that the discovery
was not covered by the plain-view ex-
ception. The trial court suppressed the
evidence seized from the trunk.
The Supreme Court reversed the sup-
pression order, holding that the trial
court finding that an emergency existed
was well founded and that the police ac-
tions to neutralize the danger were rea-
sonable and narrowly tailored. The
court specifically held that the entry in-
to the trunk was reasonable and the re-
sulting discovery and seizure of the
drugs was constitutionally permissible.
The mere fact that the police suspected
there was criminal activity afoot did not
turn their actions into a pretext for an
unconstitutional criminal investigation.
Conclusion
The exigent circumstances exception
to the warrant requirements is a flexi-
ble exception and has been applied in a
variety of situations. However, practi-
tioners should remember that this ex-
ception, like any other exception to the
warrant requirement, should be nar-
rowly tailored. The state and federal con-
stitutions, and the opinions interpreting
those constitutions, express unambigu-
ous support for the principle that war-
rants should be obtained whenever fea-
sible. Exigent circumstances may justify
violating this principle, but claims of
such exigencies always should be exam-
ined with care.
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Former CBA Employee Wins National Award
Linda Kennerly, practice development administrator for Rothgerber, Appel, Powers & Johnson and former employee in the
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